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FOREWORD 
FROM HERO TO GOAT: MANAGED CARE IN THE 1990s 
THOMAS L. GREANEY* 
For health care law and policy, the 1990s can be characterized as the 
decade of managed care.  The phenomenon of payors strongly influencing 
health spending and utilization decisions spread rapidly.  As this was 
happening, the landscape of legal relationships and regulatory controls 
witnessed a dramatic change as well.  By the mid- nineties, health care 
premiums, which had been spiraling out of control for years and had provoked 
calls for comprehensive changes in the system, came under control.  However, 
managed care was not to leave the playing field as the hero that had 
successfully forced a long-overdue rationalization of health care delivery and 
payment.  Instead, its fate was more akin to a veteran first baseman who allows 
a ground ball to go through his legs and denies baseball’s most worthy and 
long-suffering fans their one chance in a lifetime of winning the World Series.1  
In the view of many consumers and lawmakers, managed care became 
synonymous with interference with physician discretion, restrictions on patient 
choice and profiteering by insurance companies.  The legal fallout was 
extensive administrative regulation and numerous judicial decisions directed at 
constraining managed care. 
As background for Saint Louis University’s Symposium on Managed Care, 
this essay offers a brief historical sketch of the managed care era and presents 
three perspectives for considering future directions.  The excellent articles that 
comprise the Symposium offer the reader a rich understanding of the legal and 
policy issues that face judges and lawmakers today. 
A Brief History of Managed Care in the 1990s.  At the outset of the 
decade, most observers heralded managed care as the solution to spiraling 
costs and a guarantor of quality.  The Clinton health reform proposal made 
managed care the centerpiece of a comprehensive federal program designed to 
reshape the structure of health care insurance and delivery in America.  After 
 
* Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for Health Law Studies, Saint Louis University 
School of Law. 
 1. Specific names of historical antecedents to the text have been withheld at the request of 
the Buckner family and Boston Red Sox. 
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the demise of the Clinton Plan, most states chose not to adopt wide-ranging 
reforms, and instead contented themselves with the success of managed care in 
containing costs.  Some incremental change appeared at the federal level as 
well, with legislation such as the Kennedy-Kassebaum bill ensuring to some 
extent portability of insurance and limiting some unpopular insurance 
practices. With increased reliance on risk sharing by providers and selective 
contracting, the need for efficient means of delivering services was apparent 
and “integration” became the watchword of the industry.  Providers integrated 
horizontally and vertically, and various forms of integrated delivery systems 
appeared in almost every community.  For most policymakers and economic 
analysts, this was a natural progression toward rationalizing a delivery system 
long out of touch with market forces.  Legal doctrine began to accommodate 
these changes.  Judicial decisions and administrative rules in diverse areas 
including ERISA, antitrust, malpractice, tax-exemption, fraud and abuse and 
Medicare law reflected a consensus that provider cooperation and integration 
was necessary in the new era of managed care. 
However, the gears of legal and institutional change shifted abruptly in the 
mid-nineties.  Growing dissatisfaction among consumers and providers with 
the constraints imposed by managed care, together with legal regimes that 
seemed to protect payors from accountability, fostered the so-called “managed 
care backlash.”2  A torrent of state legislation targeting the shortcomings of 
managed care was quickly enacted.  At the same time, many of the institutional 
arrangements that had grown up to support the new world of provider and 
payor integration began to fall apart.  For example, “disintegration” of 
unsuccessful PHO’s, bankruptcies of IPA’s, and unwinding of mergers became 
commonplace.  Finally, many of the legal doctrines that had previously 
supported managed care were reexamined; judicial and administrative law 
developments reflected increasing skepticism about the practices and 
performance of the industry.3 
An Economic Perspective. The economics of managed care offers some 
insight into the underlying causes of the above described changes.  Most 
fundamentally, managed care represents only one of several players that jointly 
 
 2. A large literature has developed on the managed care backlash.  See Clark C. Havighurst, 
The Backlash Against Managed Health Care: Hard Politics Make Bad Policy, 34 IND. L. REV. 
395 (2001); David Mechanic, The Managed Care Backlash: Perceptions and Rhetoric in Health 
Care Policy and the Potential for Health Care Reform, 79 MILBANK Q. 35 (2001); Alain C. 
Enthoven & Sara J. Singer, Unrealistic Expectations Born of Defective Institutions, 24 J. HEALTH 
POL. POL’Y & L. 931 (1999); Marc A. Rodwin, Backlash As a Prelude to managing Managed 
Care, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1115 (1999); Alain C. Enthoven et al., Consumer Choice 
and the Managed Care Backlash, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 1 (2001). 
 3. See Thomas L. Greaney, Whither Antitrust? The Uncertain Future of Competition Policy 
in Health Care, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 185 (discussing influence of backlash on 
judicial decisions in antitrust). 
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determine medical spending decisions.  Patients, the ultimate consumers of 
health services, demand care and influence provision of services by their 
buying decisions.  It is well known, of course, that their choices are shaped by 
forces such as moral hazard resulting from insurance coverage and imperfect 
information owing to the technical and complex nature of health services.  
Choice is also subject to the influence of agency relationships.  Patients’ access 
to care and selection of providers is limited by the choices made by their 
employers.  Employers shop and choose insurance coverage on behalf of their 
employees and share in the cost of paying for that coverage.  However, the 
menu of plans ultimately presented to employees is usually severely limited.  
The managed care entity may select a limited array of providers and influence 
consumers’ choices with controls including financial incentives such as 
capitation or measures such as utilization reviews and deselection of 
physicians.  Finally, providers of care, especially physicians, strongly influence 
spending decisions through their advice to patients, selection of treatment 
modalities and referrals. 
Plainly the cumulative effect of these somewhat imperfect agency 
relationships reduces the likelihood that the market is satisfying consumer 
preferences. Appreciation of the separation between spending decisions and 
the “consumer” also underscores the fundamental dilemma facing managed 
care.  Economizing on costs inevitably entails some intrusion on medical 
decision-making.  As Haavi Morreim described it, 
[V]irtually every medical decision is a spending decision, and third parties can 
control their costs only by controlling, or at least by influencing, actual 
decisions about patient care. . . . Plans regard themselves as entitled to 
determine what they will pay for, and physicians believe that they themselves, 
not business managers or even medical directors, should decide what is best 
for patients.4 
The inevitability of joint payor/provider/consumer decision making in 
health care does not mean that, left unimpeded, the market will produce a 
smooth, efficient, or satisfying result for the parties.  Yet it does suggest that 
advocates for managed care and market-based health care policies must do a 
better job in focusing on the infrastructure necessary to support workable 
competition in the industry and to correct abuses that undermine its legitimacy 
in the eyes of the public. 
A Political Perspective. The managed care era was characterized by 
shifting political coalitions.  Initially, managed care enjoyed the support of 
liberals and conservatives as a market based alternative to command and 
control regulation.  The Clinton Administration’s Health Security plan sought 
to build a centrist coalition behind sweeping structural changes that would rely 
 
 4. E. Haavi Morreim, Battling for Control of Health Care Resources, 7 INDEP. REV. 237, 
238 (2002). 
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on managed care principles.  However, the legislation foundered on the strong 
opposition of much of the insurance industry, which feared an aggressive, 
federal regulatory hand in the form of large quasi-public intermediaries would 
come to impose on it unacceptable regulatory constraints.5  While organized 
medicine did not support the Clinton reforms, its opposition was relatively 
muted.6  After the demise of the Clinton reforms, however, the legislative 
agenda of medicine changed dramatically, with the American Medical 
Association (“AMA”) actively supporting widespread legislative interventions 
to deal with managed care (including, ironically, many that the Clinton reforms 
would have imposed). 
Looked at from the perspective of politics, it is clear that during the 
nineties the medical community allied with consumer groups to focus on issues 
of quality, choice and safety that were implicated by evolving managed care 
arrangements.  The union of these “previously antagonistic forces” found 
significant success at the state level.7  The resulting “devolution” of policy 
making from federal to state governments may have produced opportunities for 
the well-organized local apparatus of medical interest groups to achieve policy 
objectives vital to their economic and professional interests.8  While the efforts 
to enact a federal “patients’ bill of rights” appears stalled as of this writing,9 
proposals to control managed care have found receptive audiences at the state 
level.10 
Managed care may be faulted for the shortcomings that invited a strong 
response from the political and legislative processes.  An investigation by the 
Office of Inspector General (OIG) at the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services revealed a startling failure to report adverse actions against 
 
 5. See HAYNES JOHNSON & DAVID S. BRODER, THE SYSTEM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF 
POLITICS AT THE BREAKING POINT  (1996).  For an argument that the political campaign against 
the Clinton reform relied on dubious premises, see James Fallows, A Triumph of Misinformation, 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan. 1995, at 26. 
 6. In fact some medical groups supported reform, while the AMA gave mixed signals.  See 
JOHNSON & BRODER, supra note 5. 
 7. Louise Trubek, Public Interest Lawyers and New Governance: Advocating for 
Healthcare, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 575, 586 (2002).  See also Carl F. Ameringer, Devolution and 
Distrust: Managed Care and the Resurgence of Physician Power and Authority, 5 DEPAUL J. 
HEALTH CARE L. 187, 192 (2002) (“collaborative activities between physicians and consumers at 
the state level . . . furthered the political agenda of organized medicine”). 
 8. See Ameringer, supra note 7, at 192 n.29 (summarizing evidence that relative to 
managed care, physicians are better organized at the state level than at the federal level). 
 9. On the merits of a patients bill of rights, see George J. Annas, A National Patients’ Bill 
of Rights, 338 New Eng. J. Med. 695 (1998) (supporting).  But see David A. Hyman, Regulating 
Managed Care: What’s Wrong with a Patients’ Bill of Rights, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 221 (2000) 
(opposing). 
 10. See Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care “Patient Protection” Laws: 
Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failures, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1999). 
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physicians to the National Practitioner Data Bank.11 The OIG observed several 
explanations for this phenomenon including managed care’s abandonment of 
its role in clinical oversight and their emphasis price in lieu of quality.  As 
Clark Havighurst summarized the quality shortcomings of managed care, 
“[M]ost plans are not rigorously selective in their choice of subcontractors . . . . 
Managed care today means little more than subcontracting and capitation.”12 
In addition, it should be recalled that many in the insurance industry 
vigorously opposed not only the Clinton reforms but also less intrusive 
reforms.  As Alain Enthoven described managed care’s role: “Some health 
plans have resisted market-improving legislation, in part because they may 
benefit from market imperfections that allow them to attract healthy 
populations while avoiding the sick. The industry generally has not supported 
responsible multiple-choice arrangements.”13 
The managed care backlash was driven both by public dissatisfaction with 
waiting times and access to physicians, but perhaps more importantly by the 
perception of inadequacies in care attributable to managed care.14  In addition, 
the absence of choice of health plans may have contributed to public attitudes.  
An important factor driving opinion on managed care is not just the type of 
health plan people are enrolled in, but also the extent to which they have a 
choice in the matter.  The results of a national survey indicate that persons 
without choice at enrollment are substantially less satisfied with their plan and 
with managed care in general than are persons with choices. 15 
Legal Perspectives. Managed care’s performance has been shaped in part 
by the legal framework in which it operates.  Markets need information, 
mobility and accountability to function properly.  We have learned that health 
markets are deficient in many of these areas and many legal reforms have been 
proposed to ameliorate these failures.  These include measures to support risk 
pooling, encourage choice for employees, prevent risk selection and insure that 
core coverage is not denied to consumers.  Moreover, the legal system is 
charged with preventing managed care from externalizing its costs.  As Marc 
Rodwin has put it, “Backlash is unlikely to disappear until the industry matures 
and thoughtful regulatory authority protects the public, and the industry from 
 
 11. During a nine-year period, eighty-four percent of MCOs never reported an adverse event.  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, 
MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATION NONREPORTING TO THE NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA 
BANK: A SIGNAL FOR BROADER CONCERN, at i (2001). 
 12. Clark C. Havighurst, Vicarious Liability: Relocating Responsibility for the Quality of 
Medical Care, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 11 (2000). 
 13. Enthoven & Singer, supra note 2, at 935. 
 14. Robert J. Blendon et al., Understanding the Managed Care Backlash, HEALTH AFF. 
July-Aug. 1998, at 80. 
 15. Atul A. Gawande et al., Does Dissatisfaction With Health Plans Stem From Having No 
Choices?, HEALTH AFF. Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 184. 
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itself.”16  However, many of these reforms have been stymied by a variety of 
institutional and legal impediments.  Most notably, the piecemeal regulatory 
system fostered by shared federal and state responsibilities and ERISA 
operates to fragment and thwart reform efforts.  Whether the nation will have 
the benefit of multiple laboratories of experimentation, a cacophony of 
conflicting and ineffective regulation, or gridlock, remains an open question. 
The Symposium.  This Symposium issue brings together some of the 
nation’s foremost legal authorities who address many of the topics mentioned 
in this essay.  This outstanding group of scholars, practitioners and government 
officials critically analyze the key legal, social and economic issues that will 
influence the future of managed care. 
The Center for Health Law Studies also owes a debt of gratitude to Mary 
Ann Jauer for her tireless work in putting together the arrangements for the 
authors’ presentations in the Spring and to the editors of the Saint Louis 
University Law Journal for their excellent work in editing the contents of this 
volume. 
 
 
 16. Rodwin, supra note 2, at 1124.  For the view that quality control is unlikely to be 
advanced through state law and tort litigation, see Richard Kronick, Waiting for Godot: Wishes 
and Worries in Managed Care, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1099 (1999). 
